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Abstract
We study banksincentive to pool assets of heterogeneous quality when
investors evaluate pools by extrapolating from limited sampling. Pooling
assets of heterogeneous quality induces dispersion in investorsvaluations
without a¤ecting their average. Prices are determined by market clearing
assuming that investors cannot borrow nor short-sell. A monopolistic bank
has the incentive to create heterogeneous bundles only when investors have
enough money. When the number of banks is su¢ ciently large, oligopolistic
banks choose extremely heterogeneous bundles, even when investors have
little money and even if this turns out to be collectively detrimental to
the banks. If in addition banks can originate low quality assets, even at a
cost, this collective ine¢ ciency is exacerbated and pure welfare losses arise.
Robustness to the presence of rational investors and to the possibility of
short-selling is discussed.
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1 Introduction
Many nancial products such as mutual fund shares or asset-backed securities con-
sist of claims on composite pools of assets. Pooling assets has obvious advantages,
for example in terms of improved diversication, but it may sometimes make it
harder for investors to evaluate the resulting nancial products. Due to time or
other constraints, investors may only be able to assess limited samples of assets
in the underlying pool. At the same time, as implied by many behavioral studies,
investors may tend to rely too much on their own sample, trading as if it were
representative of the underlying pool.1
If investors overweight their own limited sample when evaluating pools of as-
sets, bundling assets of heterogeneous quality may induce dispersion in investors
valuations, and this may in turn a¤ect asset prices. We study, in such an en-
vironment, the incentives for nancial institutions to design complex nancial
products backed by assets of heterogeneous quality. In particular, we investigate
how these incentives change depending on whether potential investors have more
or less money in their hands and whether there is more or less market competition
in the banking system. Addressing such questions can be viewed as contributing
to the large debate concerned with assessing the pros and cons of the increasing
complexity of nancial products.2
We develop a simple and deliberately stylized model to address our research
question and later on add extra ingredients aimed at enriching some of our basic
insights. We consider several banks holding assets (say, loan contracts) of di¤erent
quality (say, probability of default). Banks are able to package their assets into
pools as they wish and sell claims backed by these pools. We abstract from the
design of possibly complex security structures and assume that banks can only
sell pass-through securities (i.e., shares of the nancial products). Each investor
randomly samples one asset from each pool and assumes that the average value of
the assets in the pool coincides with this draw considered as representative. In our
stylized model, we consider an extreme version of excessive reliance on the sample
and assume that no other information is used for assessing the value of a pool. In
particular, investors do not consider how banks may strategically allocate assets
into pools,3 nor do they draw any inference from market prices.
1This can be derived from forms of representativeness heuristic, extrapolation, overcondence,
or cursedness. We discuss these models in more details below.
2Krugman (2007) and Soros (2009) are prominent actors of such a debate.
3Through the choice of how heterogeneous the assets are, the bank a¤ects whether small
samples are more likely to be representative of the entire pool. If banks were to pool homogenous
assets, one draw would be highly representative of the assets in the pool. If banks instead tend
3
We further assume that the draws determining the representative samples are
made independently across investors. This implies that if the underlying assets of
a given package are heterogeneous, the evaluations of the package are dispersed
across investors. This captures the view that more complex or innovative nancial
products, interpreted in our framework as products backed by assets of more
heterogeneous quality, are harder to evaluate.4 Hence, even starting with the same
objective information, investors may end up with di¤erent assessments, which
agrees with the observations made in Bernardo and Cornell (1997) and Carlin,
Longsta¤ and Matoba (2014).5 It should be stressed that our approach does
not assume a systematic bias in how the individual evaluations compare to the
fundamental values. Indeed, even though the individual evaluations are dispersed,
they are correct on average due to the extrapolation from idiosyncratic samples.
Despite the absence of systematic bias, market clearing prices are a¤ected by
how assets are packaged since, as we show, prices need not be determined by the
average evaluations.
To emphasize that our mechanism is unrelated to risk aversion, investors are
assumed to be risk neutral. They are also wealth-constrained and cannot short-
sell. Thus, pooling heterogeneous assets excludes from trading those investors
who end up with low valuations, and at the same time it extracts more wealth
from those investors who end up with good valuations. Prices are driven by more
optimistic valuations when wealth constraints are slack, while they depend on more
pessimistic valuations when wealth constraints are severe. The larger investors
wealth, the larger are the incentives for banks to induce disagreement by creating
heterogeneous pools. As it turns out, the market structure of the banking system
is also a key determinant of whether banks nd it good to create heterogeneous
pools. We show that more wealth and/or more competition lead to the emergence
of more heterogeneous pools.
We rst consider a monopolistic setting. We characterize conditions on in-
to pool assets of heterogeneous quality (as we show they do) this is no longer the case.
4We focus on a form of complexity that comes from the pooling of heterogeneous assets, as it
is typically the case for structured nancial products. This form of complexity arises in particular
when the distribution from which individual assets are drawn is not known to investors. Our
model could be extended to investigate other forms of complexity, as we discuss in the concluding
remarks.
5Mark Adelson (S&P chief credit o¢ cer): "It [Complexity] is above the level at which the
creation of the methodology can rely solely on mathematical manipulations. Despite the outward
simplicity of credit-ratings, the inherent complexity of credit risk in many securitizations means
that reasonable professionals starting with the same facts can reasonably reach di¤erent conclu-
sions." Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives,
September 27, 2007. Quoted in Skreta and Veldkamp (2009).
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vestorswealth under which the monopolistic bank prefers to pool all assets into
a single bundle, thereby creating the largest dispersion in investorsevaluations.
We also dene a threshold on investorswealth such that when investorswealth
exceeds the threshold, the bank prefers to sell its loans with some non-trivial pack-
aging, while when wealth falls short of this threshold, disagreement decreases asset
prices, and so selling the loans as separate assets is optimal for the bank.
Our next central question is whether increasing competition between banks
a¤ects their incentives to pool assets of heterogeneous quality. Our main result is
that these incentives are increased when several banks compete to attract investors
capital. A key observation is that, in a market with many banks, investors who
happen to sample the best asset from some bundles must be indi¤erent between
buying any of those, as otherwise the market would not clear. This implies that,
irrespective of investorswealth, the ratio between the price of a bundle and the
value of its best asset must be the same across all bundles.
Each bank has then an incentive to include its most valued asset into a bundle
of largest size, which can be achieved by pooling all its assets into a single bundle.
We show that such a full bundling is the only equilibrium when the number of
banks is su¢ ciently large, irrespective of investorswealth. This should be con-
trasted with the monopolistic case, in which the bank has no incentive to bundle
at low levels of wealth.
The main message of our paper is that more wealth in the hands of investors
and/or more competition between banks to attract investors strengthen the incen-
tives for banks to increase belief dispersion by proposing more complex nancial
products; that is, products backed by assets of more heterogeneous quality. In
a monopolistic market with very wealthy investors, inducing belief dispersion is
protable since those who end up with less optimistic views prefer to stay out
of the market. In a market with many banks, and even if investorswealth is
low, inducing belief dispersion is the best strategy as doing otherwise would be
benecial to other banks (due to investorscomparisons of assets) and, in turn, it
would attract a lower fraction of investorswealth.
The implications of bundling in terms of asset prices, and so in terms of banks
and investorspayo¤s, are however quite di¤erent in monopoly and oligopoly. In
fact, we show that even though full bundling is the only equilibrium in the highly
competitive case, banks would be in some cases better o¤ by jointly opting for
a ner bundling strategy. We refer to such a situation as a Bundlers Dilemma.
We show that Bundlers Dilemmas are driven by the fact that any bank is worse
o¤ when the other banks o¤er larger bundles, so that bundling creates a negative
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externality on the other banks. When o¤ering larger bundles, each bank is not
only "stealing" investorswealth from its competitors, but it is also decreasing the
total amount of wealth attracted in the market, thereby making banks collectively
worse o¤.
We then extend the baseline model and show that our main insights are robust
when we introduce the possibility of short-selling (subject to constraints similar
to those for buying) as well as a fraction of rational investors who have the correct
evaluation of the various nancial products. We also consider the possibility for
banks to originate low quality loans, which we call lemons, at a cost that exceeds
the fundamental value of the loans. We show that loan origination introduces
a novel form of collective ine¢ ciency, which has a avor similar to that of the
Bundlers Dilemma. In equilibrium, each bank originates a number of lemons and
pools them with one high quality loan. The overall equilibrium outcome is worse
for banks than what it would be if they could collectively commit to originating
fewer lemons.
We also discuss some welfare implications of our results. In our baseline model,
banksstrategies can distort asset prices. While in richer settings one can think of
several reasons why distorted prices are not socially desirable, within our model
prices only induce a transfer of wealth between banks and investors. As we assume
quasi-linear preferences, those wealth transfers do not a¤ect total welfare (dened
by adding up the welfare of investors and the prots of banks). When we consider
that banks can originate new loans, instead, pure welfare losses arise, and we study
how those losses depend on the number of competing banks as well as on the loan
origination cost.
While obviously stylized, our insights echo some evidence about the dysfunc-
tioning of some nancial markets, in particular in relation to the subprime mort-
gage crisis. Overly complex nancial products and excessive production of low
quality loans, driven by the orginate-to-distribute model, have been at the heart of
the crisis (Purnanandam (2010), Allen and Carletti (2010), Maddaloni and Peydró
(2011)). We believe our model sheds a novel light on this evidence by proposing
an explicit mechanism through which banks would create excessive complexity
and originate too many loans in an attempt to fool naive investors. Beyond the
mortgage crisis, our analysis suggests several insights of independent interest that
could be brought to the data. Specically, our framework can serve as a building
block for a systematic investigation of the incentives to issue asset-backed securi-
ties along the business cycle. We suggest that pool heterogeneity tends to be larger
in good times, which is consistent with Downing, Ja¤ee and Wallace (2009) and
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Gorton and Metrick (2012). In terms of asset prices, existing evidence suggests
that overpricing tends to be associated with low breadth of ownership (Chen, Hong
and Stein (2002)), higher investorsdisagreement (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina
(2002)), and higher asset complexity (Henderson and Pearson (2011), Célérier and
Vallée (2017), and Ghent, Torous and Valkanov (2017)). Our model suggests how
to think in a unied way about these ndings and it proposes a precise link be-
tween complexity, disagreement, and overpricing, which should be the subject of
future tests.
Literature
The heuristic followed by our investors builds on several closely-related behav-
ioral aspects previously discussed in the literature. Our investors extrapolate from
small samples as modelled by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). The corresponding
valuation method can be related to the representativeness heuristic (in particular,
to the law of small numbers) as well as to the extrapolative heuristic, which have
been widely discussed in psychology as well as in the context of nancial markets.6
Our formalization is most similar to Spiegler (2006) and Bianchi and Jehiel (2015),
but the literature o¤ers several other models of extrapolative investors.7
The excessive reliance on the sample used by our investors can also be related to
a form of base rate neglect (they insu¢ ciently rely on outside information such as
the prior) or to a form of overcondence (leading investors to perceive their signals
as much more informative than everything else, in a similar vein as in Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003)). This also makes investors exposed to the winners curse, as
they do not take su¢ ciently into account the information that other investors may
have and that may be revealed by the prices.8 This is the key behavioral aspect of
our model. Even starting with heterogenous beliefs, if investors were rational, they
6Tversky and Kahneman (1975) discuss the representativeness heuristic and Tversky and
Kahneman (1971) introduce the "law of small numbers" whereby "people regard a sample ran-
domly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all
essential characteristics." In nancial markets, evidence on extrapolation comes from surveys
on investorsexpectations (Shiller (2000); Dominitz and Manski (2011); Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014)) as well as from actual investment decisions (Benartzi (2001); Greenwood and Nagel
(2009); Baquero and Verbeek (2008)).
7These include De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Barberis, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998), Rabin (2002), and Rabin and Vayanos (2010).
8Previous theoretical approaches to the winners curse include the cursed equilibrium (Eyster
and Rabin (2005)) or the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005) and Jehiel and
Koessler (2008)) that have been applied to nancial markets by Eyster and Piccione (2013),
Steiner and Stewart (2015), Kondor and Koszegi (2017), or Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2017).
See also Gul, Pesendorfer and Strzalecki (2017) for an alternative modelling of coarseness in
nancial markets.
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would not be willing to trade at prices above fundamentals in our setting. Several
studies consider trade driven by heterogeneous beliefs in nancial markets, as
Miller (1977) or Harrison and Kreps (1978).9 Compared to the previous behavioral
models in nancial economics, our focus on the bundling strategies of banks has no
counterpart. As already highlighted, its key and novel aspect is that it structures
the distribution of signals that investors receive.
A large literature on security design shows that an informed issuer may reduce
adverse selection costs and promote trade by pooling its assets and create securi-
ties whose evaluations are less sensitive to private information (see e.g. Myers and
Majluf (1984), Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), Biais
and Mariotti (2005), DeMarzo (2005), Dang, Gorton, Holmström and Ordonez
(2017)). Arora, Barak, Brunnermeier and Ge (2011) argue that asymmetric infor-
mation can instead be exacerbated when issuers choose the content of the pools
and design complex securities. Part of this literature has also studied how nan-
cial institutions can exploit investorsheterogeneity by o¤ering securities catered
to di¤erent investors (see e.g. Allen and Gale (1988) for an early study and Broer
(2018) and Ellis, Piccione and Zhang (2017) for recent models). Unlike in that
literature, the heterogeneity of beliefs in our setting is not a primitive of the model
(in fact, we do not need any ex-ante heterogeneity across investors), but it is en-
dogenously determined by the bundling decisions of banks. Relative to security
design, our focus on banks bundling decision is complementary, and it shows
that inducing dispersed valuations may be protable even if banks cannot o¤er
di¤erentiated securities.
Finally, the potential benets of bundling have been studied in several other
streams of literature, from IO to auctions.10 In particular, a recent literature
on obfuscation in IO studies how rms can exploit consumersnaïveté by hiding
product attributes or by hindering comparisons across products.11 Our banks can
be viewed as using bundling to make it harder to evaluate their assets, but unlike
in models à la Gabaix and Laibson (2006) they cannot make assets more or less
visible to investors.
9See Xiong (2013) for a recent review and Simsek (2013) for a model of nancial innovation
in such markets.
10In the context of a monopolist producing multiple goods, see e.g. Adams and Yellen (1976)
and McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989). For models of auctions, see e.g. Palfrey (1983)
and Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn and Moldovanu (2007).
11See Spiegler (2016) for a recent review of these models, and Carlin (2009) for an application
of obfuscation to nancial products.
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2 Baseline Model
There are N risk-neutral banks, indexed by i = 1; :::; N . Each bank possesses a
set of asset X = fXj; j = 1; :::; Jg; where xj 2 [0; 1] denotes the expected payo¤
of asset Xj. For concreteness, Xj may be thought of as a loan contract with face
value normalized to 1, probability of default 1  xj 2 [0; 1]; and zero payo¤ upon
default. We order assets in terms of increasing expected payo¤. That is, we have
xj  xj+1 for each j:
Each bank may pool some of its assets and create securities backed by these
pools. Each bank can package its assets into pools as it wishes. We represent
the selling strategy of bank i as a partition of the set of assets X; denoted by
i = firgr; in which the set of bundles are indexed by r = 1; 2; ::: We focus on
complexity considerations that arise merely from banksbundling strategies. That
is, we do not consider the use of possibly complex contracts that would map the
value of the underlying pool to the payo¤ of the securities, and we assume that
each bank i simply creates pass-through securities backed by the pool ir for each
r. Accordingly, an investor who buys a fraction ! of the securities backed by ir
is entitled to a fraction ! of the payo¤s generated by all the assets in ir. The
expected payo¤ of bank i choosing i is dened as
i =
X
r
ir p(ir); (1)
where jirj is the number of assets contained in ir and p(ir) is the price of the
security backed by ir. We denote the set of bundles sold by all banks by A =
ffirgrgNi=1.
There is a continuum of risk-neutral investors.12 For each bundle ir, an in-
vestor samples one basic asset from ir at random (uniformly over all assets in 
i
r)
and assumes that the average expected value of the assets in ir coincides with this
draw. We assume that the draws are independent across investors.13 It follows
that if jirj = 1; investors share the same correct assessment of bundle ir. But,
if jirj > 1, investors may attach di¤erent values to ir depending on their draws.
As already mentioned, however, bundling heterogenous assets only induces belief
dispersion and no systematic bias in the average valuation across investors.
As investors are risk neutral and they buy claims on the total payo¤ generated
12Considering such a limiting case simplies our analysis as it removes the randomness of
prices (which would otherwise vary stochastically as a function of the prole of realizations of
the assessments of the various investors).
13More generally, the insights developed below would carry over, as long as there is no perfect
correlation of the draws across investors.
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by bundle ir; they care about the average expected value of the assets in 
i
r.
Prices are determined by market clearing, assuming that investors have ag-
gregate wealth W and that they cannot borrow nor short-sell (an assumption we
relax in Section 5). The supply and demand of the securities backed by ir are
dened as follows. If ir consists of jirj assets, the supply of ir is
S(ir) =
ir : (2)
The demand for ir depends on the prole of valuations across all investors and
all bundles. The set of these valuations can be represented as [x1; xJ ]A associating
to each bundle ir 2 A; for r and i; a valuation exir;k (uniformly drawn from ir).
By the law of large numbers, each asset in each generic bundle ir is sampled by
a fraction 1= jirj of investors. Hence, the fraction of investors characterized by a
valuation prole exk = (exir;k)r;i is
k =
Y
i
Y
r
1
jirj
for all k:
The demand for ir is dened by
D(ir) =
W
p(ir)
X
k
kk(
i
r); (3)
where k(ir) 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of the budget of investors with valuationsexk allocated to bundle ir: Given the risk-neutrality assumption, each investor
allocates his entire budget to the securities perceived as most protable. That is,
denote by exk(ir) = exir;k the valuation of bundle ir according to the prole exk:We
have,
k(^) > 0 i¤ ^ 2 arg max
ir2A
exk(ir)
p(ir)
and exk(^)  p(^)  0;
and
irk(
i
r) = 1 if max
ir2A
(exk(ir)  p(ir)) > 0.
The timing is as follows. Banks simultaneously decide their selling strategies so as
to maximize the expected payo¤ as described in (1); investors assess the value of
each security according to the above described procedure and form their demand
as in (3); a competitive equilibrium emerges, which determines the price for each
security so as to clear the markets for all securities.
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3 Monopoly
We start by analyzing a monopolistic setting with N = 1 (we omit the superscript
i for convenience), and we study the e¤ect of investorswealth on the incentives
for the bank to bundle its assets. Intuitively, the larger the wealth, the more
optimistic are the investors who x the market clearing price, and so the bigger
the incentive for the bank to create heterogeneous bundles.
We note that bundling is protable to the extent that only the investors who
overvalue the bundle (as compared with the fundamental value) are willing to
buy. The question is whether the wealth possessed by those investors is su¢ cient
to satisfy the corresponding market clearing conditions at such high prices. An
immediate observation is that bundling cannot be protable if the aggregate wealth
W falls short of the fundamental value of the assets which are sold in the market,
since selling assets separately exhausts the entire wealth and the payo¤ from any
bundling cannot exceed W (while it can sometimes fall short of W due to the
possibly pessimistic assessment of the bundle).
Another simple observation is that when investors are very wealthy (W=J >
JxJ where xJ is the best asset), the price of any bundle is determined by the most
optimistic evaluation of the bundle -that is, by the maximum of the draws across
investors- irrespective of the banks bundling strategy. In this case, it is optimal
for the bank to create as much disagreement as possible, so full bundling strictly
dominates any other strategy.
More generally, the larger the aggregate wealth W , the more protable it is to
create bundles with several assets of heterogeneous value. While full bundling is
optimal when W is large enough, some non-trivial but partial bundling is optimal
at intermediate levels of wealth whereas at su¢ ciently low levels of wealth, the
bank nds it optimal to sell its assets separately. More precisely, if wealth is so
low that pooling fX1; X2g and o¤ering the other assets separately is dominated
by o¤ering all assets separately, then no other bundling can be protable, which
in turn yields:
Proposition 1 Some bundling strictly dominates full separation if and only if
W > max(2(x2 + x1);
X
j
xj).
4 Oligopoly
We now consider multiple banks, and observe that the incentives to o¤er assets
in bundles are larger in markets with su¢ ciently many banks. As it turns out,
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when N is large, full bundling is the only equilibrium, even at levels of wealth at
which a monopolistic bank would sell its assets separately. We then show that
bundling creates a negative externality on the other banks, which can lead banks
to situations similar to a Prisoners Dilemma.
4.1 Full Bundling is the Only Equilibrium
Consider some partition of assets across banks. Let r be a generic bundle (the
identity of the selling bank is not important), Jr  1 the number of elements in
r; x

r the highest value of the assets in bundle r, pr the market clearing price of
a security backed by r and dene:14
r  pr
xr
:
We rst show that, when N is large, market clearing requires that the ratio r is
constant across all bundles sold by all banks.
Lemma 1 There exist 0 2 (0; 1] and N0 such that if N  N0 then market
clearing requires
pr = 0x

r for all r 2 A: (4)
Moreover, N0 can be chosen irrespective of the partition of assets into bundles.
Notice that 1=r denes the highest returns of bundle r. That is, the returns
perceived by those investors who happen to sample the best asset xr in that bundle.
According to Lemma 1, market clearing requires that those highest returns should
be equalized across bundles when N is large enough. To have an intuition for
this, notice that if a bundle r1 had a strictly larger ratio than all other bundles,
it would attract at most those investors who sample no best asset from any of
the other bundles. When N is large, and so the number of bundles is large, the
probability of sampling no best asset from all other bundles is small. In this case,
the fraction of wealth attracted by bundle r1; and so its price, is also small, and
for N large enough that would contradict the premise that r1 had a strictly higher
ratio. The proof extends this intuition, showing that the markets would not clear
unless the ratios r are equated across the various bundles. That N0 can be set
independently of the partitions of assets into bundles follows because there are
only nitely many possible partitions of the assets for any bank.
14Notice r cannot be dened when xr = 0; which occurs when x1 = 0 and x1 is sold as a
separate asset. In this case, its price cannot be di¤erent from zero. Since this case is immaterial
for our equilibrium construction, we ignore it in the next lemma.
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Lemma 1 implies that, when N is large, the price of each bundle is driven by its
highest valued asset. This suggests that each bank has an incentive to maximize
the most valued asset in a bundle, which can be achieved by pooling all assets into
a single bundle. Of course, this loose intuition does not take into account that
the constant of proportionality 0 depends itself on the bundling strategies of the
banks. But, as it turns out, full bundling is the only equilibrium when N is large
given that in this case a single bank cannot a¤ect much 0.
Proposition 2 Suppose xJ > xJ 1: Irrespective of W , there exists N such that
if N  N then full bundling is the only equilibrium.
To have a ner intuition as to why full bundling is an equilibrium, suppose all
banks propose the full bundle and bank j deviates to another bundling strategy.
From Lemma 1, the fraction of wealth allocated to each bundle depends on the
value of its best asset. Full bundling gives a price proportional to xJ for all assets,
while the deviating bank would at best sell J   1 assets at a price proportional
to xJ and one asset at a price proportional to its second best asset xJ 1: Relative
to the other banks, the deviating bank would experience a loss proportional to
(xJ   xJ 1); and this remains positive irrespective of N . At the same time, all
banks could benet from the deviation if the total amount of wealth invested were
to increase. Such an increase is bounded by the fraction of wealth not invested
before the deviation, which corresponds at most to the mass of those investors who
sample no best asset from any of the bundles. When N is large, these investors
are not many, and so the increase in wealth is small, which makes the deviation
not protable.
The proposition also rules out any other possibly asymmetric equilibrium.
Starting from an arbitrary prole of (possibly asymmetric) bundles, we show
that the bank receiving the lowest payo¤ would be better o¤ by deviating to
full bundling.
4.2 The Bundlers Dilemma
Another implication of Lemma 1 is that each bank is better o¤ when the other
banks choose ner partitions than when they o¤er coarser partitions of their assets.
Let us introduce the following denition.
Denition 1 Consider two partitions ~i and i of X i: We say that ~i is coarser
than i (or, equivalently, that i is ner than ~i) if ~i can be obtained from the
union of some elements of i:
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We can show that, irrespective of its strategy, each bank receives lower payo¤s
when the other banks o¤er coarser partitions than when they o¤er ner partitions.
When the other banks o¤er coarser partitions, the total amount of wealth invested
is lower since the probability of sampling an asset whose value is lower than the
price from all bundles is larger. At the same time, from Lemma 1, banks o¤ering
coarser partitions receive a larger fraction of this wealth as some of their best assets
would be included in larger bundles. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider partitions ~ and ; where ~ is coarser than . If N 
N0; irrespective of its strategy and of W , each bank is better o¤ when all other
banks o¤er partition  than when they o¤er partition ~.
Proposition 3 implies in particular that each bank is better o¤ when the other
banks sell their assets separately than when they o¤er them in bundles. In this
sense, we say that bundling creates a negative externality on the other banks.
This externality leads to a new phenomenon, which we call Bundlers Dilemma
(with obvious reference to the classic Prisoners Dilemma).15 Full bundling can
be the only equilibrium and at the same time be collectively bad for banks, in the
sense that if banks could make a joint decision they would rather choose a ner
bundling strategy.
Denition 2 We have a Bundlers Dilemma when i) Full bundling is the only
equilibrium, and ii) Banks would be better o¤ by jointly choosing a ner bundling
strategy.
A special (extreme) case of the Bundlers Dilemma arises when banks would be
collectively better o¤ by selling their assets separately, while in equilibrium they
are induced to o¤er the full bundle. This occurs under the following conditions.
Corollary 1 Suppose N  N and
W
N
2 (Jx1;
X
j
xj
1  ( 1
J
)N
): (5)
We have a Bundlers Dilemma in which full bundling is the only equilibrium while
banks would collectively prefer full separation.
15We thank Laura Veldkamp for suggesting this terminology.
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Equation (5) follows from simple algebra. WhenW=N > Jx1; the price of each
bundle is strictly greater than x1. Otherwise, all investors would be willing to buy
irrespective of their draw, all wealth would be extracted, and the price of each
bundle would exceed x1; leading to a contradiction: It follows that investors who
draw X1 from all bundles, that is a fraction (1=J)N of investors, do not participate
and each bundle gets at most
W
N
(1  ( 1
J
)N): (6)
The upper bound in (5) is derived by imposing that (6) does not exceed
X
j
xj so
that each bank would be better o¤ if all assets were sold separately (in which case
they earn min(W
N
;
P
j xj)). Note that if one thinks of the ratio W=N as remaining
constant as N varies, the corollary implies that a Bundlers Dilemma can arise if
the ratio W=N lies in (Jx1;
X
j
xj) and for all N above the threshold N.
4.3 The Bundlers Dilemma in a Cherry/Lemons Market
Corollary 1 describes an extreme form of Bundlers Dilemma in which prices fall
short of fundamentals. We now show that the range over which such a dilemma
can occur is considerably larger, in particular covering cases in which the prices
are above the fundamentals. In order to illustrate this most simply, we specialize
the set of asset as
X = fxj = 0 for j  J   1; and xJ = x > 0g : (7)
That is, each bank has one good asset (a cherry) with value x and J   1 assets
valued 0; which we call lemons. While stylized, this setting allows us to capture
most clearly the possibility of pooling high and low quality assets. It also simplies
considerably the bundling strategy, which amounts to deciding the number of
lemons included in the pool together with the cherry. This simplication enables
an explicit characterization of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for having full
bundling in equilibrium as well as when Bundlers Dilemmas arise.
If N banks choose a symmetric strategy and o¤er a pool of size J , the payo¤
for each bank is
(J) = min(Jx; (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
): (8)
Dene
N^(W ) = maxfN : Jx  (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
g: (9)
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WheneverN is smaller than N^(W ), if all banks bundle all their assets, the resulting
market clearing price of each bundle is Jx, which is clearly the most a bank can
hope to get. It follows that when N  N^(W ) full bundling is an equilibrium,
and it can be shown it is the only equilibrium. More interesting is the existence
of N(W ) such that if N  N(W ) full bundling is the only equilibrium. The
threshold N(W ) is determined so that when all banks o¤er the full bundle, it is
not protable to deviate and attract all those who sample a lemon from the other
banks. The threshold N(W ) decreases in W and N(W ) ! N when W ! 0;
where
N = minfN : (J   1
J
)N 1  (1  (J   1
J
)N)
1
N
g: (10)
The threshold N ensures that, as in Proposition 2 for the baseline model, full
bundling is the only equilibrium irrespective of W when N  N: The following
proposition provides a complete characterization of when full bundling emerges as
an equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Assume that (7) holds. There exists N(W ) (increasing in J and
going to 1 as J grows large) such that full bundling is the only equilibrium when
N  N^(W ) or N  N(W ); and whenever N^(W ) < N(W ) it is not an equilibrium
for any N 2 (N^(W ); N(W )): Moreover, for any N  N then full bundling is the
only equilibrium.
We can now characterize more generally the scope of the Bundlers Dilemma
is this setting. As long as the payo¤ from o¤ering the full bundle of size J is lower
than (J   1)x; banks would be collectively better o¤ by removing one lemon from
the bundle, thereby leading to a Bundlers Dilemma.
Corollary 2 Suppose that (7) holds and N  N(W ): There is a Bundlers Dilemma
if and only if (J) < (J   1)x:
4.4 Fixed Number of Signals
In our baseline model, investors sample each bundle once so that as one increases
the number of banks, investors are bound to sample more bundles. Alternatively,
one may assume that the sampling capacity of investors is xed independently of
the number of bundles, say each investor can sample at most B bundles. Suppose
that, conditional on sampling, investors sample one asset uniformly over all assets
in the bundle (as in the baseline model), and that they do not trade a bundle they
have not sampled irrespective of its price. In this alternative formulation, we can
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show that Proposition 2 holds provided that both N and B are su¢ ciently large.
The key ingredient for our results is that investors are able to compare across
su¢ ciently many bundles.
Proposition 5 Suppose that each investor can sample at most B bundles and
never trades a bundle that is not sampled. There exists B and N set indepen-
dently of W such that if N  N and B  B then full bundling is the only
equilibrium.
Showing the equivalent of the Bundlers Dilemma result in Corollary 1 is im-
mediate, noticing that when B < N , each bundle would get at most (1 ( 1
J
)B)=N;
so we have a Bundlers Dilemma when N  N, B  B and
W
N
2 (Jx1;
X
j
xj
1  ( 1
J
)B
):
Similarly, in the cherry/lemons context described by (7), our analysis can be ex-
tended in a straightforward way by noticing that when B < N , the payo¤ in (8)
writes as
(J) = min(Jx; (1  (J   1
J
)B)
W
N
):
5 Short-Selling and Rational Investors
We now investigate the robustness of our main ndings to the introduction of short-
selling and of rational investors. Questions of interest are: 1) Can the Bundlers
Dilemma arise in the presence of permissive short-selling constraints for sampling
investors? 2) Can the Bundlers Dilemma arise in the presence of very wealthy
rational investors?
5.1 Short-Selling
We assume that investors can use their wealth both for buying and for short-
selling. In particular, an investors trading capacity can be dened as (w; s);
meaning that such an investor can use his budget to buy w=p units of an asset
of price p or short-sell s=p units of the same asset. The severity of short-selling
constraints can be measured by s: While the baseline model with no short-selling
corresponds to s = 0; we now consider the case in which s = w; which corresponds
to the case in which the constraints on buying and short-selling are symmetric.
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Accordingly, the aggregate short-selling capacity is
S = W: (11)
In order to determine the market clearing prices with short-selling, the supply of
a bundle ir dened in (2) should be modied as
S(ir) =
ir+ Sp(ir)
X
k
kk(
i
r); (12)
where k(ir) 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of the short-selling capacity of investors with
valuations exk used to short-sell bundle ir:
In order to show that a Bundlers Dilemma can arise even with permissive
short-selling constraints as dened in (11), we specialize the set of assets X as in
(7). That is, every bank is endowed with one cherry worth x and J   1 lemons
worth 0.
We rst observe that condition (11) implies that, irrespective ofW , the unitary
price of each bundle p cannot strictly exceed x=2. If p > x=2; investors prefer to
short-sell a bundle based on a valuation 0 rather buying another bundle based on
a valuation x: Hence, the demand for a bundle is determined by those who sample
only good assets. For any N and J , this fraction cannot exceed the fraction of
those who sample at least one bad asset and are then willing to sell, showing that
there is excess supply at any p > x=2: This observation is summarized in the
following claim.
Claim. Assume that (11) holds. We have p  x=2 and so (J)  Jx=2
irrespective of W and of the bundling strategy.
To set our benchmark, consider rst a monopolistic setting, i.e. N = 1. Sup-
pose the monopolist o¤ers a bundle consisting of the J   1 lemons and the good
asset. Market clearing at any price p 2 (0; x) requires
1
J
W
p
=
J   1
J
S
p
+ J;
where the left hand-side is the demand associated to those who sample the good
asset and the right hand-side is the supply (J) of the bank augmented by the
short sales (J 1
J
S
p
) of those who sample a lemon. When S  W and for any J  2,
supply exceeds demand at any positive price. In this case, creating disagreement
is detrimental to the bank, and the bank prefers to sell the assets separately.
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Proposition 6 Assume that (7) and (11) hold and suppose N = 1: Full separation
strictly dominates any bundling.
Consider now a setting with N > 1. When all banks o¤er a bundle of size J;
market clearing at any price p 2 (0; x=2) requires
(1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
1
p
= J + (
J   1
J
)N
S
N
1
p
:
When W = S, the corresponding payo¤ for each bank is given by
S(J) = min(Jx=2; (1  2(J   1
J
)N)
W
N
): (13)
Similarly to the case with no short-selling, dene
N^S(W ) = maxfN : Jx=2  (1  2(J   1
J
)N)
W
N
g; (14)
and observe that whenN  N^S(W ), full bundling is an equilibrium as no deviation
would allow a bank to obtain more than Jx=2; which is the payo¤ obtained with
full bundling. We can also dene NS(W ) such that if N  NS(W ) full bundling
is the only equilibrium. As with no short-selling, NS(W ) decreases in W and
NS(W )! NS when W ! 0; where
NS = minfN : (
J   1
J
)N 1  J(N   1)
2(1  J + JN)g:
We have:
Proposition 7 Assume that (7) and (11) hold. There exists NS(W ) such that full
bundling is the only equilibrium when N  N^S(W ) or N  NS(W ); and whenever
N^S(W ) < NS(W ) it is not an equilibrium for any N 2 (N^S(W ); NS(W )): For any
N  NS, full bundling is the only equilibrium.
The result in Proposition 7 should be contrasted with the monopolistic case,
in which there is no incentive to bundle when W = S. The di¤erence between
the monopoly and the oligopoly case is that in the latter case when an investor
samples a good asset from at least one bundle, he is not willing to short-sell any
other bundle (even if the sample there is bad), as short-selling is perceived to be
less protable than buying shares of the high valuation bundle. This reinforces
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our insight obtained in the baseline model that incentives to bundle are increased
when the number of banks is large.
It should also be noted that NS < N
 where N is dened in condition (10)
to be the minimal N which makes it unprotable to deviate and attract all those
investors who sample a lemon from all other banks. These investors have no other
option than staying out from the market when short-selling is forbidden. If short-
selling is allowed, instead, attracting those investors is harder, as they must nd
it protable to buy the asset of the deviating bank as opposed to short-sell any of
the other bundles. Hence, while short-selling decreases the payo¤ from bundling
(investors with low evaluations can drive the price down), it also decreases the
payo¤ from deviations. This is suggestive that full bundling may emerge with
short-selling when it cannot without short-selling (think of NS < N < N
 and W
small enough).
As for the possibility of a Bundlers Dilemma with short-selling, remember that
the payo¤ from full bundling S(J) can never exceed Jx=2 when W = S: Thus,
whenever S(J) < (J   1)x=2; following a logic similar to that with no short-
selling, it can be shown that banks would be collectively better o¤ by removing
one lemon and o¤ering each a bundle of size (J   1): This shows that a Bundlers
Dilemma can arise for a large set of prices even when W = S: Formally,
Corollary 3 Assume that (7) and (11) hold and suppose N  NS(W ): There is
a Bundlers Dilemma if and only if S(J) < (J   1)x=2:
The distribution of assets as in (7) considered in this section allows us to
illustrate in the simplest form that a Bundlers Dilemma can arise even with
permissive short-selling constraints. While we expect that similar insights can
be obtained outside this simple and clearly special specication, further work is
needed to gain a more complete view on the impact of short-selling constraints
with a general distribution of assets.
5.2 Rational Investors
We now introduce some possibly very wealthy rational investors in our model.
These investors can perfectly assess the fundamental value of each bundle irre-
spective of the bundling strategies chosen by the banks, which can be interpreted
within our sampling framework as allowing them to make innitely many draws
from each bundle. We denote their aggregate wealth as WR and their aggregate
short-selling capacity as SR.
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We start with the immediate observation that in our setting rational investors
have a stabilizing e¤ect on prices, so if their trading capacity is unlimited (i.e. WR
and SR ! 1 ), prices are always equal to fundamentals. For any given N , and
irrespective of banksstrategies, rational investors know the fundamental value of
each bundle. If their trading capacity is su¢ ciently large, they would arbitrage
away any mispricing. Any price strictly below (above) fundamentals would result
in excess demand (supply), hence market clearing can only occur at prices equal
to fundamentals, and banks have no incentive to bundles assets. Formally,
Claim. Let (W;S) be the trading capacity of the sampling investors. For
every N , there exist (WR; SR) such that for all WR > WR and SR > SR; prices
are equal to fundamentals irrespective of banksstrategies.
We next explore whether when rational investors face tough short-selling con-
straints, a Bundlers Dilemma can arise despite the presence of rational investors.
In order to illustrate this possibility, consider again the set of assets X as in (7).
We note that whenever prices are above fundamentals in the context of Corol-
lary 2, having wealthy rational investors (with no short-selling capacity) would
not a¤ect the equilibrium analysis, since such investors would assess that assets
are overvalued and would thus prefer to stay out of the market. This simple
observation implies:
Corollary 4 Assume that (7) holds, SR = S = 0 and N  N(W ): Irrespective of
WR > 0; there is a Bundlers Dilemma whenever (J) 2 (x; (J   1)x):
6 Loan Origination
In this section, we modify our baseline model of Section 2 and introduce the
possibility for banks to originate new loans. Specically, we specialize the initial
set of assets as
X0 = fxj = 0 for j  J0   1; and xJ0 = x > 0g ; (15)
that is the same as in (7) with J0 denoting the initial number of loans. We then
assume that banks can originate lemons at unitary cost c > 0; which can be
interpreted as the cost of processing a new loan. In this setting, the only reason
for banks to originate lemons is to pool them with the good asset.
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6.1 Monopoly
To set our benchmark, consider rst a monopolistic case with N = 1. The payo¤
from o¤ering a bundle with J assets is given by
M(J) = min(Jx;W=J)  c(J   J0)+;
where (J   J0)+ = max(J   J0; 0) and J   J0 corresponds to the new loans which
are originated and pooled. Similarly to the baseline setting, bundling dominates
separation if and only if M(2) > x. The bank o¤ers a bundle of size JM , where
JM = arg maxJ2N M(J):
6.2 Oligopoly
Consider now a setting with N > 1. Since banks originate loans only to pool
them, they would not originate any extra loan if o¤ering a pool of size J0 (i.e.
pooling all the assets they are endowed with) were not an equilibrium when loan
originations are not allowed, i.e. c =1. Hence, from now on, we assume that
N  N^(W ) or N  N(W ) at J = J0;
where N^(W ) and N(W ) are dened in Proposition 4.
Denote with D(JD; J) the payo¤ of a bank o¤ering a pool of size JD when all
other banks o¤er a pool of size J . In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (we
will show it exists) every bank o¤ers ~J loans, where
~J = arg max
JD2N
D(JD; ~J):
Our interest is in nding out ~J and in how it compares to an e¢ cient determination
of loans. Our rst result, shown in the Appendix, is that if originating one extra
loan is not protable, then it cannot be protable to originate any larger number
of loans. It is then useful to dene the payo¤ from originating one extra loan when
all other banks o¤er a bundle of size J , that is
(J) = D(J + 1; J)  (J):
One can show that (J)  x  c for all J , so it is never protable to originate a
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new loan if c > x. Hence, from now on, we assume that
c < x: (16)
Moreover, one can show that (J) is decreasing in J when (J)  0: Accordingly,
let us dene
J^ = min
J2N
fJ : (J)  0g: (17)
If banks o¤er a bundle of size J < J^; then by denition of J^ deviating and o¤ering
a bundle of size J + 1 is protable, implying that there is no equilibrium in which
all banks o¤er a bundle of size J < J^: If banks o¤er a bundle of size J = J^ ; then
we can show that D(JD; J^) < (J^) for all JD 6= J^ ; implying that banks o¤ering
a bundle of size J^ denes an equilibrium. This is stated in the next proposition.16
Proposition 8 All banks o¤ering a bundle of size J^ as dened in (17) constitutes
a symmetric equilibrium. There is no symmetric equilibrium in which all banks
o¤er a bundle of size J < J^:
6.3 Excessive Origination
Our main interest lies in comparing the equilibrium number of loans J^ with the
number of loans that maximizes the joint payo¤ for the banks, denoted as J and
dened by
J = arg max
J2N
(J)  c(J   J0)+;
where (J) is dened in expression (8): We rst observe that when other banks
o¤er bundles of size J < J the marginal benet of originating and bundling an
extra asset is x; which exceeds the origination cost. Hence, there is no J < J that
corresponds to a symmetric equilibrium, implying that J^  J. More precisely,
we have J^ = J if and only if (J)  0 and J > J0: If instead (J) > 0 or if
J < J0; then J^ > J and J^ is dened by equation (17). In summary,
Proposition 9 We have J^  J for all c and J0: We have J^ > J when J0 > J
or when (J) > 0:
The proposition shows that the possibility for banks to originate and pool low
quality loans leads to a collective ine¢ ciency, from the banksperspective. The
16The proposition rules out equilibria with J < J^ but not with J > J^: This is su¢ cient for
our purpose of showing that even at J^ there is excessive loan origination (see Section 6.3).
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number of lemons that are sold in equilibrium exceeds not only those o¤ered by
a monopolistic bank, but also what oligopolistic banks would choose if they could
make a joint decision.17 If banks could collectively commit, they would rather
originate fewer loans, enjoy higher payo¤s, and save the origination costs.
While similar in avor, this form of collective ine¢ ciency is distinct from the
Bundlers Dilemma highlighted in our previous analysis. First, the ine¢ ciency
related to excessive loan origination occurs even when investors are very wealthy.
Second, it has sharper welfare implications. The Bundlers Dilemma in our base-
line model was only a¤ecting asset prices. Given that we assume quasi-linear
preferences and that, within the model, prices have no other consequence than a
wealth transfer between banks and investors, distorted prices do not a¤ect aggre-
gate welfare, i.e. the sum of investorswelfare and banksprots. Loan origination,
instead, induces pure welfare losses due to the origination costs. We now show
that, even if those costs are small, aggregate welfare losses can be substantial if
the number of banks is large enough.
Let us dene total welfare losses due to loan origination as
L = Nc(J^   J0):
Consider the case of vanishing origination costs (i.e., c! 0). It is immediate to see
that, when the cost is arbitrarily small, banks are induced to originate new loans
up to the point where full bundling is an equilibrium. As already mentioned, there
is no incentive to originate a loan if not for pooling purposes. From Proposition
4, full bundling is an equilibrium when N  N(W ); where N(W ) increases in J:
We can dene
J = max
J2N
fJ : N  N(W )g;
and observe that J^ tends to J as c tends to 0: By denition, J is the maximal
number of loans that are o¤ered in equilibrium even if the cost of generating new
loans were arbitrarily small. Even if endowed with J + 1 assets, banks would not
all o¤er a bundle of size J + 1 in equilibrium, since N < N(W ) at J = J + 1: Such
a maximal number of loans is nite when N is nite. As observed in Proposition
4, N(W ) ! 1 as J ! 1; implying that J remains bounded for any given
N: It follows that xing N and letting c ! 0, we can write the welfare loss as
L = Nc( J   J0) and notice that L ! 0 as c ! 0 since J < 1: At the same
time, we have that J ! 1 as N ! 1: Hence, if one lets c = =N for some
17Notice that NJ > JM since Jx < (1  (J 1J )N )WN at J = JM and so NJ^ > JM :
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constant  > 0 and let N ! 1; then we have L = ( J   J0) and L ! 1 since
J !1: This suggests that, even origination costs get small, welfare losses can be
signicant in a market with a large number of banks.
7 Conclusion
We have studied banksincentives to package assets into composite pools when
investors base their assessments on a limited sample of the assets in the pool.
While we have focused on a specic heuristic of investors and a specic nancial
instrument for banks, we believe our approach can be viewed as representative of
a more general theme in which investors use simple valuation models -for exam-
ple, models that worked well for similar yet more familiar products- and product
complexity is endogenous.
Our analysis could be extended to explore the incentives for nancial institu-
tions to create complexity when investors use other heuristics as well as to inves-
tigate other forms of complexity. Investors may nd it hard to evaluate nancial
products not only because of the heterogeneity of the underlying assets as in our
model but also because of the complex mapping between the value of the under-
lying and the payo¤ to investors (as for example, in mortgage-backed securities
with complex tranching structure or in several other structured products).
Complexity would also be amplied if, on top of average expected values,
investors were to assess other characteristics of the assets. Under risk aversion,
for example, investors would care about correlations across assets, which can be
di¢ cult to evaluate. Misunderstanding of correlations could be another source of
investment errors (such considerations have been a central theme in the recent
nancial crisis, Coval, Jurek and Sta¤ord (2009)). We believe that extending our
model so as to allow banks to o¤er more general securities and investors to care
about the variance in asset payo¤s is an interesting avenue for future research.
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8 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose W > max(2(x2 + x1);
P
j xj); full separation gives
P
j xj: Suppose
the bank bundles assets fX1; X2g and sells the other assets separately. Consider
rst a candidate equilibrium in which investors who sample x2 from the bundle
are indi¤erent between trading the single asset xj and the bundle. That requires
2x2=p2 = xj=pj for all j > 2; where p2 is the price of the bundle and pj is the
price of the asset xj. In addition, we need that p2 +
P
j>2 pj  W; so aggregate
wealth is enough to buy at prices p2 and pj: The above conditions give p2 
2x2W=(
P
j>2 xj + 2x2); and pj  xjW=(
P
j>2 xj + 2x2): In addition, we need that
p2  W=2 so those investors who have valuation x2 for the (x2; x1) bundle can
indeed drive the price to p2: Suppose 2x2 <
P
j>2 xj, we have
2x2P
j>2 xj+2x2
< W
2
and so p2 = min(2x2; 2x2P
j>2 xj+2x2
W ) and pj = min(xj;
xjP
j>2 xj+2x2
W ) for j > 2:So
the payo¤ of the bank is
min(W; 2x2 +
X
j>2
xj);
which exceeds
P
j xj: Suppose 2x2 
P
j>2 xj; which can only occur if J = 3 and
2x2  x3: Then we must have p2 = W=2; and p3 = x3W=4x2: That cannot be
in equilibrium since investors who sample xl still have money and would like to
drive the price p3 up. So if 2x2 > x3 investors are indi¤erent only if p2 = 2x2 and
p3 = x3: That requires W > 4x2: If W < 4x2; then we must have p2 < 2x2
p3
x3
: If
W 2 (2x3; 4x2); we have p2 = W2 and p3 = x3: If W < 2x3; we have p2 = p3 = W2 :
The payo¤ of the bank is
min(W=2; 2x2) + min(W=2; x3);
which also exceeds
P
j xj: Suppose W  max(2(x2 + x1);
P
j xj): If W 
P
j xj;
then no bundling strictly dominates full separation. If W 2 (Pj xj; 2(x2 + x1)];
we must have
P
j xj < 2(x2 + x1); that cannot be for J > 3: For J = 3 and
W  2(x2 + x1); no bundling strictly dominates full separation.
Proof of Lemma 1
Denote with H the set of (possibly identical) bundles r 2 arg minr r and
with L the set of (possibly identical) bundles r =2 arg minr r; with jHj = H and
jLj = L: Suppose by contradiction equation (4) is violated, then H  1 and L  1
and
r < ~r for all r 2 H and all ~r 2 L: (18)
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Given (18), the H bundles would attract at least all those investors who sample
xr from at least one bundle r 2 H; and so at least
Wr^ = (1 
Y
r2H
(
Jr   1
Jr
))W:
The other bundles would attract at most the remaining wealth W  Wr^: Denote
with r^ 2 H the bundle which receives the largest fraction of Wr^, it would attract
at least 1=H of it. Similarly, denote with r 2 L the bundle which receives the
lowest fraction of W  Wr^, it would attract at most 1=L of it. This implies that
pr^  min(xr^;
1
H
Wr^
Jr^
);
and
pr  1
L
W  Wr^
Jr
:
Notice that if
xr^ 
1
H
Wr^
Jr^
;
then r^ = 1 and so r^ < r would imply pr > xr; which violates market clearing.
Hence, r^ < r requires
1
H
Wr^
Jr^
1
xr^
<
1
L
W  Wr^
Jr
1
xr
; (19)
which gives
L <
Jr^
Jr
xr^
xr
W  Wr^
Wr^
H: (20)
Notice that the r.h.s. of equation (20) decreases inH and tends to zero asH !1:
In fact we can write Y
r2H
(
Jr   1
Jr
) = zH ;
for some z 2 (0; 1) and so
W  Wr^
Wr^
H =
zH
1  zHH: (21)
We notice that the r.h.s. of equation (21) decreases in H i¤H ln z   zH + 1 < 0,
that H ln z   zH + 1 decreases in H and that ln z   z + 1 < 0 for all z 2 (0; 1):
Hence, condition (20) is violated if either H or L (or both) grow su¢ ciently large,
which must be the case when N ! 1 since H + L  N (the total number of
bundles cannot fall short of the number of banks). Hence, there exists a N0 such
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that equation (4) must hold for N  N0, which proves our result.
Proof of Proposition 2
We rst show that full bundling is an equilibrium when N is large. We then
show that no other bundling can be an equilibrium when N is large.
Part 1. If N is su¢ ciently large, full bundling in an equilibrium for all W .
Suppose all banks o¤er the full bundling and denote with F the payo¤ for
each bank. If (1   (J 1
J
)N)W
N
 JxJ then F = JxJ and no other bundling can
increase bankspayo¤s. Suppose then
(1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
< JxJ : (22)
We have
F  (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
: (23)
The condition is derived by noticing that each bundle attracts at least those who
sample the maximal asset in the bundle xJ . These investors are willing to invest
all their wealth since the price of the bundle is strictly lower than their evaluation.
From (22), the price of the bundle is lower than xJ .
Suppose bank j deviates and o¤ers at least two bundles, indexed by r. The
payo¤ of the deviating bank is j =
X
r1
Jrpr:From (4) we have
j = 0
X
r1
Jrx

r; (24)
and so
j  0(J   1)xJ + 0xJ 1: (25)
Notice also that j + (N   1)J0xJ  W and since from (24) j  0
X
j
xj; we
have
0  WX
j
xj + (N   1)JxJ
:
Together with (25), that gives
j  ((J   1)xJ + xJ 1)WX
j
xj + (N   1)JxJ
:
In order to show that the deviation is not protable, given (23), it is enough to
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show that
((J   1)xJ + xJ 1)WX
j
xj + (N   1)JxJ
< (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
: (26)
Equation (26) can be written as
(
J   1
J
)N <
X
j
xj   JxJ +N(xJ   xJ 1)X
j
xj + (N   1)JxJ
: (27)
Notice that the l.h.s. of equation (27) decreases monotonically in N and tends to
zero as N ! 1; while the r.h.s. of equation (27) increases monotonically in N
and tends to
xJ   xJ 1
JxJ
> 0;
asN !1: Hence, j < F and so full bundling is an equilibrium forN su¢ ciently
large.
Part 2. If N is su¢ ciently large and irrespective of W; no alternative bundling
is an equilibrium.
Suppose there is one bank, say bank j; which o¤ers at least two bundles and
it deviates by o¤ering the full bundle. From (4), the payo¤ of the deviating bank
can be written as 0JxJ : If 0 = 1; then the deviation is protable since any other
bundling would give strictly less than JxJ : Suppose then 0 < 1: As the price
of each bundle is strictly lower than the best asset from the bundle, those who
sample xr from at least one bundle r will invest all their wealth. The total amount
of wealth invested is then at least
W^ = (1 
Y
r
(
Jr   1
Jr
)M)W
where M is the number of bundles o¤ered after the deviation. Since M  N and
Jr  J for all r, we have
W^  (1  (J   1
J
)N)W: (28)
Consider rst a candidate symmetric equilibria in which the payo¤ of the non-
deviating banks is the same and it is denoted by  j. By denition we have
j + (N   1) j  W^ and  j  0xJ 1 + (J   1)0xJ ; which gives 0JxJ + (N  
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1)0xJ 1 + (N   1)(J   1)0xJ  W^ : Hence,
0  W^
JxJ + (N   1)xJ 1 + (N   1)(J   1)xJ ;
and so
j  W^JxJ
JxJ + (N   1)xJ 1 + (N   1)(J   1)xJ :
Since the payo¤ before deviation was at most W=N; the deviation is protable if
JxJ(1  (J 1J )N)W
JxJ + (N   1)xJ 1 + (N   1)(J   1)xJ >
W
N
; (29)
which writes
xJ   xJ 1 > N
N   1(
J   1
J
)NJxJ ;
and that shows that j > F and so the alternative bundling is not an equilibrium
for N su¢ ciently large:
Suppose there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. Denote with j the payo¤ of
a generic bank j in such equilibrium, we must have minj j < maxj j. Consider
bank ~j 2 arg minj j: Suppose bank ~j deviates and o¤ers the full bundle. From
the above argument, its payo¤ after deviation would be at least W^=N and from
(28) W^ ! W as N ! 1: Since ~j 2 arg minj j; we have ~j < W=N: Hence,

~j < W^=N for N su¢ ciently large, which rules out the possibility of asymmetric
equilibria when N is large.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote with r the bundles o¤ered by a generic bank j. Its payo¤can be written
as j =
X
r1
Jrpr and from (4) we have
j = 0
X
r1
Jrx

r; (30)
for some 0: If all other banks o¤er a partition  = ffgf ; we have
F0 (
X
r1
Jrx

r + (N   1)
X
f1
Jfx

f ) = W
F ; (31)
for some F0 ; and where W
F is the total amount of wealth invested. Suppose
instead that the other banks o¤er a partition ~ = fcgc, which is coarser than ,
we have
C0 (
X
r1
Jrx

r + (N   1)
X
c1
Jcx

c) = W
C ; (32)
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for some C0 andW
C . Suppose that C0  F0 ; then we must haveWC  W F : The
fraction of wealth which is not invested corresponds to the probability that an
investor samples an asset with value lower than the price from all bundles. This
probability cannot be larger in  than in ~: By denition, there exists at least one
element ~c 2 ~ which is obtained by the union of at least two elements ~f ; ^f 2 :
Hence, if C0  F0 , the probability to sample an asset whose value is lower than
the price in ~c cannot be lower than the probability to sample such an asset both
in ~f and in ^f . Notice that from (31) and (32) C0  F0 contradicts WC  W F
since by denition
X
c1
Jcx

c >
X
f1
Jfx

f : Hence, we must have 
C
0 < 
F
0 and
from (30) this shows that bank j receives an higher payo¤ when the other banks
o¤er a ner partition.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let us rst show when full bundling is an equilibrium. Suppose all banks o¤er
the full bundle and the price is p = x: As prices cannot increase further, there is
no protable deviation. We have p = x when
Jx  (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
; (33)
that can be written as N  N^(W ): Suppose p 2 (0; x) and a bank deviates and
sells a bundle of size JD: Denote with pD the unitary price of the deviating bank
and with ~p the unitary price of the other banks (all non-deviating banks should
be traded at the same price or markets would not clear).18 Suppose that pD < ~p;
market clearing for the deviating bank requires
1
JD
W
pD
= JD;
while market clearing for the other banks requires
(1  1
JD
  JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)
W
(N   1)~p = J:
Condition pD < ~p requires
min(x;
1
JD
1
JD
W ) < min(x; (1  1
JD
  JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)
W
(N   1)
1
J
):
18Suppose there is a group ofM  1 non-deviating banks with p = p1 and some non-deviating
bank with p = p2 and p2 > p1: The demand for a bank with price p1 is at least 1J (
J 1
J )
M 1P;
where P is the probability of drawing no good asset from a bundle with price p < p1; while the
demand for a bank with price p2 is at most 1J (
J 1
J )
MP; which cannot exceed the demand of a
bank with price p1; thereby contradicting that p2 > p1:
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Notice that the condition can be satised only if x > 1
JD
1
JD
W; and so pD < ~p
requires in particular
1
JD
1
JD
< (1  1
JD
  JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)
1
(N   1)
1
J
;
that is
(
J   1
J
)N 1 < 1  J(N   1)
J2D   JD
; (34)
The payo¤ of the deviating bank is W=JD so the deviation is protable only if
1
JD
> (1  (J   1
J
)N)
1
N
;
that is,
(
J   1
J
)N 1 > (1  N
JD
)
J
J   1 : (35)
Conditions (34) and (35) require
(J   JD) (J + JD   JN   1) > 0
Since non-deviating banks are bundling all their assets, we have J > JD and so
conditions (34) and (35) require J + JD   JN   1 > 0; which is violated for any
N  2 and J > JD: Hence, we cannot have a protable deviation with pD < ~p:
Suppose instead that pD = ~p: The payo¤ of the deviating bank is min(JDx;
^D(JD; J);W=JD); with
^D(JD; J) =
JD
JD + (N   1)J (1 
JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)W: (36)
Total demand corresponds to those investors who sample the good asset from at
least one bundle (this is a fraction 1   JD 1
JD
(J 1
J
)N 1 of the investors), and each
bundle receives a fraction of the demand in proportion to its size (so the deviating
banks receives a fraction JD
JD+(N 1)J ). We now show that
^(JD; J) > (J) i¤ JD > J:
This means that deviation to any JD < J is not protable when pD = ~p. To
see this, notice that ^(JD; J) > (J) can be rewritten as (J 1J )
N 1 (J   JD) >
(J JD) (N 1)J(JN J+1) : If J > JD; this writes as (J 1J )N 1 > (N 1)J(JN J+1) which is violated
for all J when N = 2 and this is a fortiori true any larger N . Hence, there is no
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protable deviation with pD = ~p:
Finally, suppose that pD > ~p; market clearing for the deviating bank requires
1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1
W
pD
= JD;
as the demand comes only from those who draw a good asset for the deviating
bank and a lemon from all other banks, while market clearing for the other banks
requires
1
N   1(1  (
J   1
J
)N 1)
W
~p
= J:
Condition pD > ~p requires
min(x;
1
JD
1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1W ) > min(x;
W
N   1
1
J
(1  (J   1
J
)N 1)): (37)
The deviation is protable if and only if
min(JDx;
1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1W ) > min(Jx; (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
): (38)
Notice that
JD
J
(1  (J   1
J
)N 1)
W
N   1 < (1  (
J   1
J
)N)
W
N
since at JD = J   1 that is equivalent to N   J + J
 
1
J
(J   1)N > 0 which is the
case for N = 2 and it is increasing in N . Hence, condition (38) implies condition
(37). Dene
J^D = (
1
x
(
J   1
J
)N 1W )1=2;
we have JD = 1 if J^D  1; JD = J^D if J^D 2 (1; J 1); and JD = J 1 if J^D  J 1:
Notice that JD  1 writes
(
J   1
J
)N 1  x
W
; (39)
and JD  J   1 writes
(
J   1
J
)N 1(J   1) 2  x
W
: (40)
If (39) holds, JD = 1 and the deviation is protable if and only if
(
J   1
J
)N 1W > (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
;
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that is
(
J   1
J
)N 1N + (
J   1
J
)N > 1; (41)
If (40) holds, JD = J   1 and the deviation is protable if and only if
(J   1)x > (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
;
that is
N
W
(J   1)x+ (J   1
J
)N > 1: (42)
If both (39) and (40) are violated, JD = J^D and the deviation is protable if and
only if
x1=2(
J   1
J
)
N 1
2 W 1=2 > (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
;
that is
N(
x
W
)1=2(
J   1
J
)
N 1
2 + (
J   1
J
)N > 1: (43)
Combining cases (41), (42) and (43), let us dene
N(W ) = minfN : (N)  1g; (44)
and
(N) =
8><>:
(J 1
J
)N 1N + (J 1
J
)N if (J 1
J
)N 1  x
W
;
N( x
W
)1=2(J 1
J
)
N 1
2 + (J 1
J
)N if x
W
2 ((J 1
J
)N 1(J   1) 2; (J 1
J
)N 1);
N
W
(J   1)x+ (J 1
J
)N if (J 1
J
)N 1(J   1) 2  x
W
:
Combining (9) and (44), we have that full bundling is an equilibrium if N  N^(W )
or N  N(W ): Provided that N(W ) > N^(W ); full bundling is not an equilibrium
if N 2 (N^(W ); N(W )):
In order to see if there are other symmetric equilibria, suppose that all banks
o¤er a bundle of size J1 < J0 smaller than the full bundle, and a bank deviates
and o¤ers a bundle of size JD > J1: As shown above ^(JD; J1) > (J1) i¤ JD > J1;
implying that if J1 < J0 and ^(J1+1; J1) < W=(J1+1) the deviation to JD = J1+1
is protable. Suppose instead that ^(J1 + 1; J1) > W=(J1 + 1); so by deviating to
JD = J1 + 1 the banks gets W=(J1 + 1): The deviation is protable if
W
J1 + 1
> min(J1x; (1  (J1   1
J1
)N)
W
N
);
which is the case for all J1 for N  3: In order to sustain an equilibrium in which
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all banks o¤er a bundle of size J1 < J0; it is then necessary that N = 2 and
W=(J1 + 1) < J1x; that is
x
W
>
1
(J1 + 1)J1
 1
J0(J0   1) : (45)
It can be shown that (N) > 1 when N = 2 and (45) holds, implying that
if N  N(W ) then the deviation to JD = J1 + 1 is protable and there is no
symmetric equilibrium in which all banks o¤er a bundle of size J1 < J0.
Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose that (J0)  (J0  1)x: The payo¤ obtained when all banks remove J
lemons from the pool cannot exceed (J0   J)x; hence it cannot exceed (J0   1)x
no matter what J is. Suppose that (J0) < (J0   1)x; we have
(J0) = (1  (J0   1
J0
)N)
W
N
):
Suppose that banks were to o¤er a bundle of size J0 1 instead, their payo¤would
be
(J0   1) = min((J0   1)x; (1  (J0   2
J0   1)
N)
W
N
);
which is shown to exceed (J0) when (J0) < (J0   1)x; given that (J0 2J0 1)N <
(J0 1
J0
)N :
Proof of Proposition 5
Let us rst show that when N and B are su¢ ciently large Lemma 1 holds.
Adopting the notation in the proof of Lemma 1, suppose that H  B; then the
proof is exactly the same. If H > B; the minimal fraction of wealth attracted by
the H bundles can be written as 1  zB for some z 2 (0; 1); and so equation (20)
writes as
L <
Jr^
Jr
xr^
xr
zB
1  zBH; (46)
that is violated when B is su¢ ciently large, showing that equation (4) must hold
when B is su¢ ciently large.
We now show that full bundling is an equilibrium when B is su¢ ciently large.
The proof is exactly as in Proposition 2 when N  B: If N > B, the payo¤ from
full bundling in equation (23) writes as
F  (1  (J   1
J
)B)
W
N
; (47)
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and condition (26) for having no protable deviations can be written as
(
J   1
J
)B <
X
j
xj   JxJ +N(xJ   xJ 1)X
j
xj + (N   1)JxJ
; (48)
that is the case when B is su¢ ciently large.
Finally, we show that no alternative bundling in an equilibrium when B is
su¢ ciently large, again using the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 2.
If M  B; the proof in unchanged; if M > B, equation (28) writes as
W^  (1  (J   1
J
)B)W; (49)
and the condition for having a protable deviation as
xJ   xJ 1 > N
N   1(
J   1
J
)BJxJ ;
showing that the alternative bundling is not an equilibrium for B su¢ ciently large:
Proof of Proposition 7
First, we show when full bundling is an equilibrium. Suppose all banks o¤er
the full bundle and the price is p = x=2: Then prices cannot increase further and
so there is no protable deviation. We have p = x=2 when
x
2
J  (1  2(J   1
J
)N)
W
N
: (50)
It should be mentioned that, in (50), we say that in case of indi¤erence between
buying and short-selling, there exists a way to split the orders so as to have
p = x=2: This is similar to the treatment of p = x in condition in (33) in the absence
of short-selling. From (50), full bundling is an equilibrium when N  N^S(W ):
Suppose that p 2 (0; x=2) and a bank deviates and sells a bundle of size JD:
Denote with pD the unitary price of the deviating bank and with ~p the unitary
price of the other banks (assuming for now it is the same for all non-deviating
banks). Suppose that pD > ~p; market clearing for the deviating bank requires
1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1
W
pD
= JD +
JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1
W
pD
;
as the demand comes only from those who draw a good asset for the deviating
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bank and a lemon from all other banks, while all those who draw a lemon strictly
prefer to sell the deviating bank since pD > ~p but this is impossible to satisfy
with pD > 0: Hence, there is no market clearing at pD > ~p and so no protable
deviation irrespective of N .
Suppose instead pD < ~p; we show that even in this case there is no protable
deviation irrespective of N . Since non-deviating banks are bundling all their
assets, we have
JD < J; (51)
When pD < ~p; market clearing for the deviating bank requires
1
JD
W
pD
= JD;
while market clearing for the other banks requires
(1  1
JD
  JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)
W
(N   1)~p = J +
JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1
W
(N   1)~p;
and so
~p = (1  1
JD
  2JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)
W
(N   1)
1
J
:
The payo¤ of the deviating bank is W=JD so the deviation is protable if
W
JD
> (1  2(J   1
J
)N)
W
N
; (52)
while pD < ~p can be written as
W
JD
< (1  1
JD
  2JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)
W
(N   1)
JD
J
: (53)
Conditions (52) and (53) require that
J  N +NJD   JN + (J   1
J
)N 1(2  2J   2NJD + 2JN) > 0: (54)
We now show that, irrespective of N; conditions (51) and (54) cannot be satised.
Notice that ~p > 0 requires
(
J   1
J
)N 1 < 1=2;
and this implies that the l.h.s. of equation (54) increases in JD: Hence, from (51),
(54) must hold when JD = J 1; which writes as 2(1 J+N)(J 1J )N 1 > 2N J:
42
Suppose that N > J   1; we need
(
J   1
J
)N 1 >
2N   J
2  2J + 2N ;
which together with (J 1
J
)N 1 < 1=2 would give N < 1, which cannot be. If
N < J   1; we need
(
J   1
J
)N 1 <
J   2N
2(J   1 N) ; (55)
which requiresN < J=2 or the r.h.s. would turn negative and condition (55) would
be violated. Notice that both the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. of (55) are monotonically
decreasing in N , and so if condition (55) holds, then it must hold either when
N = 2 or when N = J=2: When N = 2; condition (55) requires J < 3; which
would violate N < J=2. The condition is also violated when N = J=2; showing
that condition (55) is violated for any N: Hence, irrespective of N; we cannot have
a protable deviation such that pD < ~p.
We consider the possibility of having a protable deviation with pD = ~p: The
payo¤ of the deviating bank is min(JDx=2; SD(JD; J)); where
SD(JD; J) =
JD
JD + (N   1)J (1  2
JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)W: (56)
When JD < J; we have that SD(JD; J) < 
S(J) if and only if
(
J   1
J
)N 1 <
J(N   1)
2(1  J + JN) : (57)
Hence, full bundling is an equilibrium if (57) holds, which is the case when N is
su¢ ciently large (the l.h.s. of (57) is decreasing in N and the r.h.s. is increasing in
N): Such bound onN is dened independently of JD since it can be easily be shown
that SD(JD; J) increases in JD if and only if (57) holds and so 
S
D(JD; J) < 
S(J)
if and only if (57) holds for all JD 6= J:
Suppose instead (57) is violated. There exists a protable deviation if JDx=2 
SD(JD; J) or if 
S(J) < JDx=2 < 
S
D(JD; J) for some JD < J: Since when (57) is
violated we have SD(JD; J) > 
S(J); it is su¢ cient to show that JDx=2 > S(J)
and in particular that (J   1)x=2 > S(J); which can be written as
(J   1)x
2
N
W
+ 2(
J   1
J
)N > 1:
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Hence, full bundling is an equilibrium if N  NS(W ), where
NS(W ) = min
N2N
fN : S(N)  1g;
and
S(N) = min((J   1)x
2
N
W
+ 2(
J   1
J
)N ; (
J   1
J
)N 1
2(1  J + JN)
J(N   1) ):
Combining with (14), we have that full bundling is an equilibrium if N  N^S(W )
or N  NS(W ) and, provided NS(W ) > N^S(W ); it is not an equilibrium if
N 2 (N^S(W ); NS(W )):
In order to show that full bundling in the only equilibrium, suppose that all
banks o¤er a bundle of size J smaller than the full bundle, and a bank deviates
and o¤ers a bundle of size JD > J: The above analysis can be replicated exactly to
show that there is no protable deviation when pD > ~p or pD < ~p: When pD = ~p;
the payo¤ of the deviating bank is dened by equation (56), and we have that
SD(JD; J) > 
S(J) if and only if condition (57) holds when JD > J . Following a
logic similar to that in the proof of Proposition 4, one can show that there is no
other equilibrium when N  NS(W ):
Proof of Proposition 8
Preliminary results
If banks o¤er a pool of size J and one bank deviates to a pool of size JD; its
payo¤ is equal to
D(JD; J) = min(JDx; ^D(JD; J);W=JD)  c(JD   J0)+; (58)
with
^D(JD; J) =
JD
JD + (N   1)J (1 
JD   1
JD
(
J   1
J
)N 1)W: (59)
The payo¤shown in (59) corresponds to the scenario in which investors who sample
the good asset from at least one bundle buy (this is a fraction 1  JD 1
JD
(J 1
J
)N 1 of
the investors), and each bundle receives a fraction of the demand in proportion to
its size (so the deviating bank receives a fraction JD
JD+(N 1)J of the demand). The
nal payo¤ in (58) cannot exceed the minimum between ^D(JD; J), JDx (since
the unit price of the bundle cannot exceed x, otherwise no one would buy it)
and W=JD (since the highest demand that the deviating bank can attract cannot
exceed the fraction of investors who sample a good asset from its bundle).
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We show that ^D(JD; J) is increasing and concave in JD. The derivative of ^D
with respect to JD is positive if and only if
1
J
(J   1)
N 1
<
J(N   1)
J(N   1) + 1 :
When N = 2; this requires (J   1) (J + 1) < J2 which is the case for all J . The
condition holds a fortiori for any larger N . Since
@2^D
@J2D
=   2
(JD   J + JN)
@^D
@JD
;
this also shows that ^D(JD; J) is concave.
We show that the payo¤
(J) = min(^D(J + 1; J); (J + 1)x;W=(J + 1)) min(Jx; (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
)  c;
cannot exceed x   c: First, notice that D(J + 1; J)   (J) > x   c only if
(1   (J 1
J
)N)W
N
< Jx: However, if (1   (J 1
J
)N)W
N
< Jx then ^D(J + 1; J) <
(J + 1)x: In fact, ^D(J + 1; J)  (J + 1)x requires J+1NJ+1(1  J+1J (J 1J )N 1) WJ+1 
x; which contradicts (1   (J 1
J
)N) W
NJ
< x:At the same time, we have ^D(J +
1; J)  (1  (J 1
J
)N)W
N
< x: In fact, ^D(J + 1; J)  (1  (J 1J )N)WN < N 1N(JN+1)(1 
J+1
J
(J 1
J
)N 1)W < (1  (J 1
J
)N) W
JN
< x:
We show that (J) decreases in J when (J)  0 and so (J) intersects
zero only once. Notice rst that if Jx < (1   (J 1
J
)N)W
N
then (J) is weakly
decreasing in J . Suppose then Jx > (1   (J 1
J
)N)W
N
which as shown implies
(J + 1)x > ^D(J + 1; J): If ^D(J + 1; J) < W=(J + 1); then
(J) = ^D(J + 1; J)  (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
)  c;
which is strictly decreasing in J if and only if JN   2J + 1 > 0; that is the case
for all N  2 and J . If ^D(J + 1; J) > W=(J + 1); then
(J) =
W
J + 1
  (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
)  c;
which is strictly decreasing in J if and only if
J + J2

1
J
(J   1)
N
+

1
J
(J   1)
N
+ 2J

1
J
(J   1)
N
  J2 < 0: (60)
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Notice that ^D(J + 1; J) > W=(J + 1) writes as
(
J   1
J
)N <
N + J   JN + J2   2
J2 + J
:
Hence, it is enough to show that (60) holds when (J 1
J
)N = N+J JN+J
2 2
J2+J
; that
requires N + JN > 3J + 2; which is always the case for N  3: If N = 2, we have
W
J + 1
< (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
);
and so (J) < 0 for all c. This shows that (J) can be increasing only if (J) <
0; hence (J) cannot intersect zero more than once. The fact that (J) must
intersect zero once follows by noticing that (J) < 0 as J !1:
Proof of the equilibrium
We now show that there exists an equilibrium in which all banks o¤er a bundle
of size J^ ; with J^ = minJ2NfJ : (J)  0g: Suppose all banks o¤er a bundle of size
J^ ; and consider a deviation with JD > J^ . Notice that by denition D(J^+1; J^) <
(J^+1)x, hence D(J^+1; J^) = min(^D(J^+1; J^); 1=(J^+1)): Suppose D(J^+1; J^) =
^D(J^ + 1; J^): For JD > J^; by concavity of ^D(JD; J^); (D(JD; J^)   (J^)) 
(JD  J^ 1)(D(J^+1; J^) (J^))  0 showing that there is no protable deviation
with JD > J^ . Suppose instead D(J^ + 1; J^) = 1=(J^ + 1); then by denition of J^ ;
D(J^ + 1; J^)  (J^) and D(JD; J^) = 1=J^D for all JD  J^ + 1; showing that no
deviation with JD  J^ + 1 can be protable.
Consider now a deviation with JD < J^ . Suppose JD = J^   1: In order to show
that D(J^   1; J^)  (J^); it is enough to show that
^D(J^   1; J^) + c  min(J^x; (1  ( J^   1
J^
)N)
W
N
): (61)
Since c < x; (61) is always satised when (1   ( J^ 1
J^
)N)W
N
> J^x: Suppose instead
(1 ( J^ 1
J^
)N)W
N
< J^x; by denition of J^ we have min(^D(J^+1; J^); 1=(J^+1)) (1 
( J^ 1
J^
)N)W
N
 c: Hence, (61) is satised if ^D(J^   1; J^) + min(^D(J^ + 1; J^); 1=(J^ +
1))  2(1  ( J^ 1
J^
)N)W
N
: Since (1  ( J^ 1
J^
)N)W
N
= ^D(J^ ; J^); it is enough that
^D(J^   1; J^) + ^D(J^ + 1; J^)  2^D(J^ ; J^);
which is the case since ^D is concave in its rst term. The concavity of ^D also
implies that no JD < J^   1 can be protable. This shows that D(JD; J^) < (J^)
for all JD 6= J^ and so there is an equilibrium in which all banks o¤er a bundle of
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size J^ :
Proof of Proposition 9
It is immediate to observe that J is determined by J1; where
J1 : Jx = (1  (J   1
J
)N)
W
N
at J = J1: (62)
The term min(Jx; (1  (J 1
J
)N)W
N
) in (8) increases in J for J < J1 and decreases
in J for J > J1: If J0  J1; banks are better o¤ by not generating any new loan.
If J0 < J1, the marginal benet of an extra loan is x for J  J1 and the marginal
cost is c. Due to (16), banks are better o¤ by generating new loans up to J1: As
J1 need not be an integer, let us dene
[J1] = B(J1);
where the function B(J1) denes the best closest integer to J1: That is, dene the
closest integers
n
J1 : J > J1   1; J 2 N
o
and

J1 : J < J1 + 1; J 2 N
	
; we have
B(J1) = J1 if J1x  (1   ( J1 1J1 )N)WN and B(J1) = J1 if J1x < (1   (
J1 1
J1
)N)W
N
:
Hence, if banks were to maximize their joint payo¤, they would o¤er a bundle
of size J = [J1]: In order to show that there is no equilibrium with J^ < [J1];
notice that if all other banks o¤er J = J1, as shown in the proof of Proposition
8, we have that ^D(JD; J1)  (JD) if and only if JD  J1 and by denition of
J1; (JD) = JDx when JD = J1: Hence, we have ^D(JD; J1)  JDx if and only
if JD  J1 when all other banks o¤er J = J1: Since bas shown in the proof of
Proposition 8, ^D(JD; J) decreases in J , we have ^D(JD; J1) > JDx for all JD  J1
when all other banks o¤er J < J1: Since ^D(JD; J1) < 1=(JD + 1) for JD  J1,
this implies that we have D(JD; J) = JDx for JD  J1 and J  J1 and so the
marginal benet of generating a new loan is x; which exceeds its marginal cost c:
Hence, we cannot have JD < J1 when J  J1; which implies that we cannot have
a symmetric equilibrium with J^ < [J1]:
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